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THE CONSTRUCTION OF "TAXABLE PROPERTY" IN
MUNICIPAL DEBT LIMITATION STATUTES
INTRODUCTION

A significant geopolitical phenomena of post World War II
America has been mass migration to metropolitan areas. As a result of this population shift local governments find themselves
confronted with a host of problems created by mass habitation
within confined geographical limits. Consequently, cities, counties,
and other political units are forced not only to expand those services which are traditionally provided by local government but
To
they must also undertake an increasing range of functions.
meet these demands local governments require greater financial
resources. Many of the services and facilities which must be supplied require large capital outlays, forcing local governments to
seek more extraordinary revenue. 2 But in attempting to borrow
capital, local governments confront constitutional and statutory obstacles in the form of limitations upon the power to incur debt. This
Comment will discuss debt limit provisions and the devices employed to avoid their effect. Particular problems in interpreting
such provisions will then be analyzed in a hope that a fresh perspective will emerge from which a recommendation may be made
for a workable local government debt limitation.
MUNICIPAL DEBT LIMITATIONS AND EVASIVE DEVICES

The power to incur debt is not an inherent power of local government. This explains why borrowed funds are termed "extraordinary revenue." A local government obtains the power to bor-

row only when it is conferred by state constitutions, statutes, and
municipal charters. 3 A power which is conferred is a power which
may be controlled, and one of the more important controls upon

1. See, H.L. LuTz, PUBLIC FINANCE ch. v, 64-63 (1924); 15 E. McCORPORATIONS § 39.02 4-7 (3d ed. 1950) [hereinafter
cited as E. MCQUILLIN].
2. Extraordinary revenue includes: (1) loans, (2) bond issues and
(3) trust funds or bequests. This is contrasted to "ordinary" revenue,
which consists of the proceeds of taxes, any monies earned by the government acting in its proprietary capacity, and funds obtained from licenses,
fees, and penalties. 15 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 39.03 pp. 8-9.
3. E.g., Howard v. Brighton, 143 Misc. 265, 257 N.Y.S. 41 (Sup. Ct.
1931); Appeal of Palmer, 307 Pa. 426, 161 A. 543 (1932); 15 E. McQUILLN,
supra note 1, § 39.07. Thirty-eight states have constitutional provisions
relating to municipal borrowing. Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Vermont do not. Of these six deal with the matter
in statutes. See Bowman, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52
IOWA L. REV. 863 n.18 (1967).
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
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municipal indebtedness is a limitation on the amount of debt which
may be incurred. Debt limit provisions are found in either statu-

tory 4 or constitutional 5 form in almost every jurisdiction, and in
some jurisdictions in both forms. 6 Generally, limits are placed on
both funded 7or bonded indebtedness, and unfunded or "floating"
indebtedness.
The most common debt restriction limits the debt incurrable to
a fixed percentage of the value of taxable property within the political unit." Usually the limit is applied directly to any debt
incurred.9 In some states two percentages are applied. The first
is applied to limit incurrence of any debt, with a larger debt limited by a second percentage which is permitted only upon approval
of the electorate. 10 A third system coordinates a debt to property
ratio with a limit based on the current revenue of the local government. That is, debt is restricted to an amount equal to current
annual revenues, with a larger debt permitted only upon approval
by the electorate, with the maximum fixed at a percentage of taxable property. 1
The genesis of local government debt limitations was the financial crises which municipalities experienced following the economic
depression of the mid-1870's. 12 Rooted in an atmosphere of ex4. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 29909, 43604; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
113, § 44 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IOWA CODE ANN. § 407.1 (1949).
5. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. XI § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. VII § 5; PA.
CONST. art. IX § 8.

6. Where there are local government borrowing provisions in both
the constitution and statutes of the same state the constitutional provision
takes precedence if there is a conflict. Such provisions in a municipal
charter are subject to both constitutional or statutory provisions. 15 E.
McQuranuN, supra note 1, § 41.06.
7. Municipal indebtedness consists either of funded debts or
floating debts. The term "funded debts" includes all municipal
indebtedness evidenced by bonds payable at a time beyond the
current fiscal year of their issue, with periodical payment of interest, and where provision is made for payment by future taxation.
15 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 39.17 p. 28.
8. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 113, § 44 (Smith-Hurd 1954):
Except as hereinafter provided in this Act no county . . . township, school district or other municipal corporation . . . shall be-

come indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount,
including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding two
and one-half percentum (2k%) on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the cost assessment for state and
county taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness.
PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8:
The debt of any county, city, borough, township, school district, or
other municipality or incorporated district, except as provided
herein, and in section fifteen (15) per centum upon the assessed
value of the taxable property therein... ;
9. E.g., PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8; VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 127.
10.
11.

tion).
12.

E.g., NEB. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1, 2.
E.g., OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 26 (extra, up to 5% of assessed valua-

Long term municipal indebtedness did not become common in
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treme fiscal caution and in an era which did not foresee modern
demands on local government, debt limit provisions have of late
been assailed by legal scholars " and lawyers. Characteristically,
the scholars attack the policy of these provisions, while the lawyers maneuver to avoid their effect. Consequently, most of the
recent litigation in this area has involved devices employed to circumvent debt restrictions.
The first technique devised to avoid municipal debt limitations was the special district.14 A special district is a quasi-governAmerica until after 1820. In its earliest states little thought was
given to restricting the incurrence of debt for two reasons: (1)
since cities could not borrow without specific legislative authorization for each incurrence, state legislatures had direct control over
the amount of indebtedness each municipality could incur, and (2)
the prevailing public opinion was that governmental borrowing
was a financial practice that should be used only in the most exceptional cases.
Internal capital improvements were made exclusively by state
governments until the Panic of 1837 forced many debt-burdened
states into default. Thereafter, public opinion became sufficiently
aroused by the poor financial positions of the state governments
that constitutional amendments were passed limiting the power of
many states to contract indebtedness. Thus, when the post-Civil
War expansion of railroads occurred, entrepreneurs turned to local
governments for capital subsidies, and market for their stock because the state governments were barred from participating by the
earlier reforms. When the Panic of 1873 caused many municipalities to default on their obligations, the trend to restrict the borrowing power of local units of government gained popular backing.
In retrospect it seems likely that the movement might not have
been fully supported had it not been for the waste and corruption
that flourished within city governments that abused the credit
system. The public demanded that the situation be remedied; the
logical remedy appeared to be deprivation of the power to incur
debt. This pattern-economic prosperity, internal capital expansion, debt incurrence, recession, default-was repeated following
both World War I and the Great Depression, although to a less
dramatic extent. It seems that we are still now experiencing a
post World War II debt expansion.
Comment, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness, UTAH
L. REV. 462, 463 (1966) (footnotes omitted). See also, KNEIR & Fox, READINGS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 189-95 (1936); FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 272-74 (8th ed. 1960).
13. See, Bowers, Limitations on Municipal Indebtedness, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 37 (1951); Bowman, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IOWA
L. REV. 863 (1967); Magnusson, Lease Financing by Municipal Corporations
as a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25 GRo. WASH. L. REV. 377 (1957);
Rogers, Municipal Debt Restrictions and Lease-Purchase Financing, 49
A.B.A.J. 49 (1963); Comment, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal
Indebtedness, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 462 (1966).
For an interesting parallel to the current local government debt problem and its historical development in this country, see, Holmes, Local
Authority Borrowing, 108 SOL. J. 910 (1964). The author illuminates the
problems which have arisen in England now that local authorities there
have begun to borrow through the issuance of bonds. He suggests that
this is creating a situation similar to that in the United States in the 1870's
(note 14, infra) and that the central government may have to control local
unit borrowing.
14. Kennebec Water Dist. v. Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902)
one of the very early cases holding that a public authority had a separate
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mental unit especially created to perform one function, or a limited range of functions, and embracing either partially or completely
the same geographical area as an existing municipal unit. 15
Debt limit provisions have usually been held to apply to each unit
of government separately, including special districts. A special
district may thus incur debt to the full percentage of the value of
taxable property within its boundaries 6 without affecting the debt
limit of the political entity which created it. 17 Since the debt is
repaid through taxes or charges levied by the special district, the
net effect is that the same property may be used to determine the
debt limits of several taxing bodies.' 8
Another means of avoiding a debt restriction is to prevent obligations which are incurred from being characterized as debts.
A common example is the special assessment.' 9 A debt is incurred
for a special project and repaid by an assessment upon property
which will benefit from the project. 20 In this way, general funds
of the political unit are not committed to the obligation. 21 Similar
to the special assessment is the pledging of revenues from an inproperty to pay the debt incurred in obtaining the
come-producing
22
property.
15 E. MCQUILLIN, supra
note 1, §§ 41.12-13. This device is still very popular. See Bowman, The
Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IOWA L. REV. 863, n.29 (1967).
15. The most common example is a school district.
16. Albuquerque Metropolitan Arroyo Flood Control Authority v.
Swinburne, 74 N.M. 487, 394 P.2d 998 (1964); Fort Howard Paper Co. v.
Town Board of Ashwaubenon, 266 Wis. 191, 63 N.W.2d 122 (1954). But
approval of special districts has not been universal. See, State ex rel.
Board of Education of Cleveland City School Dist. v. Morris, 135 Ohio St.
23, 18 N.E.2d 980 (1930). In Rappoport v. Department of Public Health
and Hospitals, 227 Ind. 508, 88 N.E.2d 150 (1940), the court invalidated a
special district which is found to have been created for the sole purpose
of increasing a city's borrowing power beyond the constitutional limit.
17. Chisena v. Central High School Dist. No. 2, 136 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
18. Such piling of district upon district, geographically oriented,
necessarily results in a corresponding multiplication of taxes for
individuals residing in an area where such overlap exists. This
heavy tax burden is inconsistent with the ostensible motivation for
original indebtedness limitation-attaining the goals of sound fiscal
policy.
Bowman, supra note 13, at 870.
19. For an excellent discussion of this device, see Antieau, The Special
Assessments of Municipal Corporations,35 MARQ. L. REV. 863, 873-80 (1967);
Comment, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness, 1966
UTAH L. REv. 462 (1966).
20. This arrangement may be effectuated by the creation of a district
or authority which builds the improvement and handles the details of issuing bonds to obtain capital and retiring them.
21. Thus the debt is held not to be a general obligation of the local
unit. Cyr and Evans Contracting Co. v. Graham, 2 Ariz. App. 196, 407
P.2d 385 (1915); Pasadena v. McAllaster, 204 Cal. 267, 267 P. 873 (1927).
22. See generally, 15 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 41.31; Foley, Reve-

debt limit relied on the special district theory.
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The special district and special assessment are valid devices
to circumvent debt limitations because the local government is
not obligated to repay the debt. But a less valid device is contingent obligation financing which involves a leasehold agreement
or executory contract. The leasehold agreements customarily provide for yearly rental payments which are credited towards purchase of the property leased. At the end of the leasehold period,
the property is conveyed to the government. The rental payments
are considered current expenses; therefore, the cost of the proprty is not incurred as a debt. 23

With executory contracts a local

unit's obligation to pay becomes effective only upon performance
by the other party. As performance is on a periodic basis, payment is also periodic. Executory contracts are analogous to leasehold agreements in that the payments are considered recurring
current expenses
and the total amount due on the contract never
24
becomes a debt.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN DEBT LIIVIT PROVISIONS

While most recent debt limit litigation concerns legal maneuvering to avoid their effect, problems of interpreting debt limit
legislation also have arisen. One such problem is determining what
is "taxable property" under a debt limit provision. The question
of what constitutes taxable property or debt limit base has been
posed in three factual settings. In each of these, the courts have
grounded their holdings on one of two basic theories. The words
are either defined to include any property which is or may be taxed
for any purpose whatsoever; or they are interpreted to include
only property which will actually be taxed to repay the debt. A
full analysis of these two positions requires an examination of
their application in the three factual settings which have raised
the issue.
The first was presented to the Supreme Court of Iowa in Zobel
v. Schau.25 That case involved property which was taxed, but not
for local government purposes. Thus, the tax revenue obtained
from such property would not contribute to the repayment of municipal debts. In Zobel, monies and credits which were taxable
nue Financing of Public Enterprises, 35 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1936); Williams
and Nehemis, Municipal Improvement as Affected by Constitutional Debt
Limitations, 37 COL. L. REV. 177 (1937).

23.

The theoretical means to this end is the common law idea that

future rents do not constitute a debt. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rogers v.
Milligan, 269 Wis. 565, 66 N.W.2d 326 (1955) contra, Brewster v. Deschutes,
137 Ore. 100, 1 P.2d 607 (1931).
24. Hillard v. Mobile, 253 Ala. 676, 47 So. 2d 162 (1950); Salisbury
Water Supply Co. v. Town of Salisbury, 341 Mass. 42, 167 N.E.2d 320
(1960). For a good discussion of this area see, Magnusson, Lease-Financing
by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25 GEO.
WASH.

25.

L. REV. 377 (1957).

150 N.W.2d 628 (1967).
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only for the purpose of retiring Korean War veterans bonus bonds,
were held to be taxable property within the meaning of the state's
constitutional and statutory debt limit provisions. The court followed two early Iowa cases which had interpreted the debt limit
provision as including all property taxed as "taxable property"
regardless of whether the property was taxed to repay the debt.
Consequently, while the tax revenue which was yielded would not
contribute to the payment of the debt, the amount of permissible
debt would be partially computed on the basis of these monies and
credits.
The Zobel setting was presented to the Supreme Court of
26
Pennsylvania in the early case of Elliot v. City of Philadelphia.
The taxpayer contended that "taxable property" meant only property taxed by the city, and that the city should not have included
the value of securities taxed by the state in ascertaining the municipal debt limit. The court agreed, holding that "taxable property" included only property taxed by the city for city purposes.
It would seem the court was looking at what property would bear
the tax burden of the debt to decide what property should be used
to determine the debt limit. But this explanation is insufficient
since three-quarters of the tax revenue yielded by the state tax on
these securities was returnd to the city treasury.
Thus, these
27
securities would bear a portion of the debt burden.
Zobel and Elliot represent opposing views on whether property
which is taxed but does not contribute tax revenues to the local
government is "taxable property" for debt limit purposes. "Taxable" can mean taxable by any governmental unit as in Zobel, or
taxable by the government unit which is going to incur the debt
as in Elliot.
A second situation which has posed the taxable property problem concerns whether tax exempt property should be included
in determining the debt limit. In Williams v. School Dist. No. 32,28
the question was whether property within the school district, but
exempt from taxation because temporarily owned by the county,
should be included in determining the school district's debt limit.29

The property had been purchased by the county at a sale to recover delinquent taxes. Only if the original owners repurchased
the property would the school district receive the taxes owed to it
at the time of the sale, and the taxes which accrued during the
period the county held the property.30 The court held that the
property was not "taxable property" for debt limit purposes, as it
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
1931, §§
(1957)).

229 Pa. 215, 78 A. 107 (1910).
229 Pa. at 217, 78 A. at 108.
56 Wyo. 1, 102 P.2d 48 (1940).
WYo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
The provisions which governed this situation were found in W.R.S.
115-2341 to 115-2342 (now Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-241 to 39-242
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might not pay its full share of taxes, and thus might not bear its
full portion of the debt burden. It would be inequitable to the taxpaying property owners in the school district to subject them to
a greater debt burden, and therefore a greater tax burden, by
including property which might not share
any of this burden in
3
determining the amount of indebtedness. 1
32
Similarly, in Monroe County v. County Debt Commission,
the county finance officer did not include the value of certain tax
exempt property in determining the county's debt limit. This
property could have been taxed according to the constitution of the
state but the legislature had chosen to exempt it. 3 3 The court held
that the constitutional debt limit,34 which was an amount equal to
two per cent of the taxable property within the county, was two
per cent of property which was actually being taxed at the time the
debt was incurred. The property might have been taxed if the legislature decided to repeal the statute, but that was at best a future
possibility. The reasoning in Monroe was similar to Williams: only
property which would definitely bear the debt burden should be
used to determine the debt limit.
In L.L.F. Realty Co. v. Fuchs35 the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York took a position opposed to the Williams and Monroe courts. The facts in Fuchs were closely analogous to those in Williams. In determining the debt limit of the
city, the city council of Long Beach had included properties the
city treasurer had bid in at a tax sale. The city would receive full
tax revenues from these properties only if they were repurchased
by the original owner. The court held that the real estate in question was "subject to taxation" and "taxable property" according
to the statutory and constitutional debt limit provisions, 3 6 as the
'7
exemption was a matter of discretion on the part of the city.

The city could, at any time, change its policy and tax these prop38
erties.
31.
32.
33.
§ 132.200
34.

56 Wyo. at 3, 102 P.2d at 53.
247 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. App. 1952), Annot. 30 A.L.R.2d 899 (1953).
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.200 (1955) (now Ky. REV. STAT.
(1963)).

ANN.

Ky. CONST. § 158.

35. 75 N.Y.S.2d 356, 273 App. Div. 111 (1947).
36. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 5; N.Y. LOCAL FiNANCE LAW § 104.6 subd. d.
37. CHARTER OF THE CITY OF LONG BEACH, Chapter 635, (Laws of 1922
as amended).
38. Williams and Monroe County represent the majority rule where
the issue is whether property specially or temporarily exempt from taxation is "taxable property." See, State v. Birmingham R.R. Co., 182 Ala.
475, 62 So. 77 (1913); State ex rel. Harrington v. Pompano, 136 Fla. 730,
188 So. 610 (1938); Campbell v. Red Bud Consol. School Dist., 186 Ga. 541,
198 S.E. 225 (1938); McKinney v. McClure, 206 Iowa 285, 220 N.W. 354
(1928); Hanson v. Omaha, 154 Neb. 72, 46 N.W.2d 896 (1951); Buffalo v.

Le Couteulx, 15 N.Y. 451 (Ct. App. 1857). Contra, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Shastra Area Pub. Util. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 2d 463, 287 P.2d 841 (Dist.
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A third situation which presents the taxable property problem
is whether real or personal property, or both, are to be used in
computing the debt limitation. In many of the older cases the applicable provision required only "property" to be the taxable standard. Thus, the courts were forced to decide whether real or personal or both types were contemplated. Traditionally, local governments received their revenues from real property taxes; thus
it was usually contended that "property" in such debt limit provisions meant only real property. For example, in McLeland v.

Marshall County 39 the court held that personal property in the

form of monies and credits was to be included in the term "property" for debt limitation purposes. Although this holding was
based on a statutory definition of "property," 40 some of the tax
revenue received from the monies and credits would go to the
county by way of the state treasury, presumably contributing to
the general county funds from which the debt would be repaid.
court, however, did not rely on this to support its
The McLeland
41
decision.
In Hicken v. Board of Education42 the same question was
raised, but here the Minnesota court had legislative support in
answering it. The statutory debt limit provision explicitly
stated43that "all property assessed" was to be the basis of the debt
44
limit.

Since personal as well as real property was assessed,

the unambiguous and inclusive nature of the provision led the
court to conclude that "property" meant both personal and real
property. 45 The court also noted that a portion of the tax revenue
assessed on monies and credits went into the defendant school
board's general funds, buttressing their decision with the impli46
cation that this property would contribute to payment of the debt.
In Levy v. McClellan47 the Minnesota court considered a constitutional debt limit provision 4 that specifically provided that
real estate was to be the basis of the debt limit. The issue before
the court was whether "special franchises" were real estate. The
state had created these franchises and had power to classify them
in any manner it pleased. As the state had classified them as
real estate49 the court held that they were to be considered as
Ct. App. 1955); L.L.F. Realty Co. v. Fuchs, 273 App. Div. 111, 75 N.Y.S.2d
356 (1947).
39. 199 Iowa 1232, 201 N.W. 401 (1924).
40. IOWA CODE 1897, § 48. No comparable definition exists today in
Iowa's statutes.
41. 199 Iowa 1232, 1241, 201 N.W. 401, 409 (1924).
42. 153 Minn. 120, 189 N.W. 709 (1922).
43. MINN. GEN. STAT. 1913, § 1862.
44. MI N. GEN. STAT. 1913, §§ 2316-2328.
45. 153 Minn. 120, 189 N.W. 709, 710 (1922).
46. Id.
47. 196 N.Y. 178, 89 N.E. 569 (Ct. App. 1909).
48. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (1872).

'9.

N.Y.

GENERAL TAX LAw

(Laws 1896 p. 796 c. 908) § 2.

Summer 1968]

COMMENTS

such for debt limit purposes. The categorization of the franchises
was for tax purposes, and they would bear their share of the
debt burden.5 0
Groendyk v. Fowler51 is an interesting analogy to this line of
cases. A statute provided that "property" owners were to vote on a
franchise to be given to a telephone company to erect telephone
poles. 52 If the franchise was approved the poles would be erected
on the real estate of those voting. The basic issue was whether
personal property owners, who would not be affected by the outcome of the vote, should have the same right to vote as real
property owners whose property would bear the burden of the
franchise. Rather than analyze the problem posed, the court turned
to a statutory definition of the term "property"' 5 which included
both real and personal property, and held that both personal
property as well as real property owners could vote on the granting of the franchise. The Groendyk case presents by analogy the
two approaches which have been taken to the problem of whether
"property" means both real and personal property in debt limit provisions. Courts may take the strict legal definition of "property"
from common law and statute, as was done in Groendyk and most
of the debt limit cases; or they may look to the property that
will bear the debt burden.
A case which followed the latter approach is Appeal of William H. Brown,54 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that "offices, posts of profit, occupations and trades" which were
taxed by the county were "property" under a taxable property
debt limit provision. The rationale was that the tax revenues
yielded by these things would help repay the debt; therefore their
value should be used to determine the amount of debt, whether
they were classified as "property" or not.
INTERPRETING DEBT LIMIT PROVISIONS

Two basic approaches to the taxable property problem emerge
from the three settings in which it has been posed. When the

question is whether "property" means only real property or real
and personal, it is decided by defining "property" according to a
formal legal definition, or by looking to whether the property will
50. In Levy, as in Hicken, 153 Minn. 120, 189 N.W. 709 (1922), and
McLeland, 199 Iowa 1232, 201 N.W. 401 (1924), the fact that the property
included to determine the debt limit would, through taxes, pay part of the
debt was not the decisive factor in the court's decision. On the contrary,
this element was given very little weight by these courts.
51. 204 Iowa 598, 215 N.W. 718 (1927).
52. IOWA CODE 1924 § 5905.
53. IOWA CODE 1924 § 63.
54. 111 Pa. 72, 2 A. 77 (1885). See, McLeland v. Marshall County,
199 Iowa 1232, 201 N.W. 401 (1924); Williams v. School Dist. No. 32, 56
Wyo. 1, 102 P.2d 48 (1940).
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bear the debt burden. When the question is whether property
which is specially exempt from taxation should be included as
taxable property, the decision turns on whether "taxable" means
potentially taxable or actually taxed. When the issue is whether
property taxed only by the state can be included to determine the
local debt limit the courts have held either that "taxable" means
taxable by any government, or only by the government which will
incur the debt.
The courts which hold that any property which is or may be
taxed by any level of government is taxable property for debt
limit purposes, apply a broad interpretation which views the
words in their common dictionary sense. The effect is to increase
the permissible amount of debt. The argument against this construction was offered in Williams v. School Dist. No. 32. 55 There
the court found that a basic inequity may result if property which
will not share its burden of the debt, is used to make the debt
larger for that property which will be taxed to repay it. When
property exempt from taxation is included in determining the debt
limit, some courts have raised this objection on the grounds that
there was a violation of due process. 56 Their rationale is that such
an interpretation imposes a confiscatory and unequal tax on property not exempted. But this argument has been rejected by most
of the courts which have considered the question. 57 A party is not
deprived of his property without due process of law merely because a tax imposes an unequal burden on that party as compared to another. 8 Due process with respect to taxation requires
only that taxes be levied as equitably as possible, since complete
equality in taxation is impossible. 59 Furthermore, the property
involved in these cases is completely exempt from taxation, and
any due process problem turns on whether it should be taxed at
all. No matter how the debt limit is determined and no matter
how great the debt is, taxed property will bear all of the burden
and exempt property will bear none of it.
A point in favor of the broad or permissive approach is that
where property which is not taxed may be taxed at some time after
the indebtedness is incurred, a more restricted definition prevents
55. 56 Wyo. 1, 102 P.2d 48, 54 (1940).
56. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Shastra Area Pub. Util. Dist., 135 Cal.
App. 2d 463, 287 P.2d 841 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); State ex rel. Harrington v.
Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610 (1938).
57. See, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Shastra Pub. Util. Dist., 135 Cal.
App. 2d 463, 287 P.2d 841 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); McLeland v. Marshall
County, 199 Iowa 1232, 201 N.W. 401 (1924). But see, State ex rel. Harrington v. Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610 (1938), where this argument
was accepted because the properties which were being taxed to repay the
debt were outside of the political unit which had incurred the debt and
was levying the tax to repay it.
58. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881).
59. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Shastra Area Pub. Util. Dist., 135 Cal.
App. 2d 463, 287 P.2d 841 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
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a local government from incurring the amount of debt justified
0
by its ability to repay.6
Likewise, where property is not taxable
by local government, but where a portion of the taxes levied on it
eventually goes to the local government, the broad approach
creates a debt in line with the total resources of the government.
The most serious argument raised against construing debt
limit provisions broadly is that it contravenes legislative or constitutional intent. 61 This argument posits that the purpose of the
legislatures and framers of state constitutions was to limit the debt
of local government to precisely that percentage of the value of
taxed property mentioned in the debt limit provision. A loose
interpretation of the words "taxable property" permits property
which is not taxed to be included in determining the debt limit,
making the debt a larger percentage of the value of taxed property
than is mentioned in the provision.
The intent of debt limit provisions is to enforce financial
responsibility upon local government by relating the amount of
debt which may be incurred to the value of property. 2 This
method was chosen because property was the chief source of revenue for local government at the time these debt limit provisions
were first enacted. It still is today. The goal was to directly
relate the debt to the ability to repay by relating the debt to
the source of repayment.
It is submitted that if this view of the purpose of debt limit
provisions is accepted, construction of these provisions limiting
the meaning of "taxable property" to property which will be taxed
to repay the debt is correct. A relation of debt to the source of repayment, that is, property which will provide revenue for the local
government, will be maintained according to the standard expressed
by the provision. Following this view, the possible inequities to
taxpayers, which so often arise with regard to debt limit provisions, would be eliminated. Only property which pays the debt will
determine the size of the debt. A firm standard would be provided for resolving the problems of what type of tax, state or local
and what type of property, real or personal, is connoted by the
phrase "taxable property." That standard is whether the property so taxed provides the political unit with the means of repaying the debt.
There are, however, serious objections to this approach. As
60 This is especially true where a long term debt is incurred, since
the property may be producing tax revenues for the larger portion of the
time the debt is outstanding.
61. See, e.g., Williams v. School Dist. No. 32, 56 Wyo. 1, 102 P.2d 48
(1940).
62. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Wagoner, 81 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1936);
Decatur v. Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 146 N.E. 360 (1925); McGuire v. Philadelphia, 245 Pa. 287, 91 A. 622 (1914); Banks v. Lehi, 74 Utah 321, 279 P.
878 (1929); see, 15 E. McQUrLn.I, supra note 1, § 41.02.
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mentioned above,63 the local government would not be permitted to
incur the full amount of debt justified by its ability to repay if
property which is not subject to taxation at the time the debt limit
is determined becomes subject to taxation at a later time. Another
problem with a narrow construction of debt limit provisions is that
property values tend to inflate along with the rest of the economy.
Property may well be worth considerably more in two or three
years than it is today. 64 Because much local government debt is
bonded over a long term, the value of property taxed at the time
bonded indebtedness is incurred may be much smaller than the
value as averaged out over the period in which the debt is retired.
Considered in this perspective the debt may actually be a smaller
percentage of the value of property which is taxed than the percentage authorized by the debt limit provision.
CONCLUSION
While the constitutional and legislative intent may have been
to limit debt according to the value of property taxed to repay
the debt, construing debt limit provisions in this manner will
leave the basic problem still unsolved. Local governments need
to borrow more than these provisions allow, and efforts to circumvent the provisions will continue. The net effect is a lessening
of control over local government borrowing and a debt which is
determined by the willingness of the courts to accept the evasive
schemes of bond counsel.
How, then, can fiscal responsibility be enforced upon local
governments while still allowing the flexibility necessary to meet
their changing financial needs? The principle behind taxable property debt limit provisions is to relate debt limit to the tax base.
This would seem to provide a workable enough standard: the
amount of permissible debt rises and falls with the value of the
source of tax revenue. Also, since creditors evaluate debt risk on
the basis of the debtor's anticipated revenues, taxable property
or tax base debt limits would be grounded in sound financial theory.
What is lacking in debt limit provisions is flexibility in terms
of changing needs. If debt limit provisions were put in only
statutory form, with a provision requiring periodic legislative review, the problem could be mitigated. At the specified intervals
the legislature would be forced to re-examine and re-evaluate the
financial situation of local governments and adjust the debt limit
accordingly by increasing or decreasing the percentage basis of the
limit. The flexibility and responsiveness to financial realities
achieved would eliminate resorting to legal manipulations to ob63. See p. 628 supra.
64. The current national annual rate of inflation is 6% (based on
Labor Department figures for 1968).
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tain borrowing power. The public would have accurate knowledge of the amount of debt being incurred, without having to pierce
legislative smoke screens. Most important, the financial necessities of local government could be balanced with financial responsibility.
RICHARD M. BURT

